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Family reunification has always been a central organizing principle of U.S.
immigration law. Indeed, the vast majority of immigrants who acquire permanent residency in the United States each year do so not because of skills or labor
market demands or refugee status but because of family ties (Abrams and Piacenti 2014). The presidency of Donald J. Trump upended this family primacy,
exposing the lack of a central organizing theory of why governments should privilege family reunification. Although Joseph R. Biden’s administration is already
undoing many of the Trump administration’s family separation policies, it is
worth reflecting on the question of why it was so easy for a single president to
dismantle a policy of family unity so quickly, as such a dismantling could easily
happen again.
During his four years in office, President Trump pushed an aggressive antiimmigration agenda. Perhaps the most infamous manifestation of this agenda
was his Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) practice of separating parents
from children at the U.S.-Mexico border and housing them separately in detention facilities. DHS conducted this mass separation of families pursuant to the
Trump administration’s “zero-tolerance policy,” under which the Department of
Justice prosecuted all adult aliens apprehended while crossing the border illegally and transferred their minor children to the custody of the Department of
Health and Human Ser vices (DHHS) during the pendency of their criminal proceedings (Kandel 2021). The number of families affected by this policy is still
uncertain. Initial reports estimated that DHS had separated over two thousand
children from their parents during the spring of 2018, and later reports by DHHS
investigators suggest that thousands more may have been separated before the
zero-tolerance policy had been officially announced.1
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The separation of migrant families caused massive public outcry and
inspired a series of demonstrations protesting the policy, united under the slogan Families Belong Together. The Families Belong Together protests reached
their zenith on June 30, 2018, when a coalition of groups—including MoveOn,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the
National Domestic Workers Alliance, and dozens more— sponsored a “nationwide day of action” to protest family separations by the Trump administration
(Andone 2018). The coalition organized a march in Washington, D.C, as well as
hundreds of sister rallies in other U.S. cities (Kirby and Stewart 2018). Across the
United States, “families belong together” and phrases like it appeared on protest signs, in speeches, and in chants. Social media posts of the events used the
tag #familiesbelongtogether (MoveOn 2018). The Families Belong Together
protests are an example of the contemporary moralization of responses to
family migration policies, as the vast majority of protesters relied on moral,
rather than legal, arguments to oppose the zero-tolerance policy. Protesters
appealed to notions of humanity, the harm done to children, and the love that
family members feel for each other. Similar campaigns employing similar strategies can be found outside the United States, such as the Love Knows No Borders
campaign in France (Amoureux au ban public 2017) and the Love Letters to the
Home Office (2014) campaign in the United Kingdom.
The separation of parents from children at the border was far from the only
Trump administration policy to affect family migration and family reunification.
Early on, the president issued an executive order banning travel to the United
States by individuals from specific countries (popularly known as the “travel
ban” or “Muslim ban”).2 He also called for an end to birthright citizenship,
increased the evidentiary burden for demonstrating birthright citizenship (Pérez
2018), and decreased approvals of family-based visas (Rosenberg 2018).3 As with
the separation of parents from their children at the border, each of these policies generated significant resistance, and much of this resistance was couched
in moral, rather than legal, terms. In response, the Trump administration frequently appealed to national security to defend its policies, arguing that too
much deference to family reunification would lead to decreased border security
and increased criminality (U.S. Department of Justice 2018).
President Biden reversed course on many of the Trump administration’s
most high-profile anti-immigration policies in the first months of his presidency;
already his administration has repealed the travel ban, ended the zero-tolerance
policy, established a task force for reunifying separated families, and instituted
restrictions and enforcement priorities for deportations.4 However, the Trump
administration’s policies and rhetoric demonstrated the vulnerability of family
reunification rights and the lack of a coherent theory for articulating those rights
in U.S. law. Those who opposed the Trump administration’s immigration
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policies faced an uphill legal battle and would likely face similar difficulties if
a future administration pursued similar policies. Most opportunities for family
reunification in U.S. immigration law are contained within statutes or regulations, rather than U.S. constitutional law, meaning that the availability of family
reunification exists largely at the whim of each Congress and presidential
administration. Given the U.S. Congress’s failure to enact immigration reform
legislation and the Trump administration’s hostile stance toward immigration,
immigrant families and their advocates were often left with constitutional
litigation as their last resort in arguing for family reunification rights. U.S. constitutional law itself has a relatively thin notion of family rights, and these rights are
particularly circumscribed in the immigration context, where national security
and foreign affairs interests often supersede individual interests in family unity.
Despite these challenges, the moral arguments made by commentators,
journalists, individual citizens, and others at protests, in op-eds, and on social
media were beginning to be translated into legal arguments in complaints,
briefs, and court opinions. This chapter excavates and categorizes the primary
moral arguments promoting family unity that emerged in response to the Trump
administration’s anti-immigration policies. Because the Trump administration’s
policies affected all forms of familial relations and brought heightened focus on
family reunification beyond couples, this chapter will focus not only on marriage
and partner migration but also on the right of parents to be reunited with their
children. A survey of mainstream media, alternative media, and social media
outlets reveals a seemingly extraordinary range of responses to the Trump
administration’s escalation of immigration enforcement and rhetoric.5 Most of
these moral arguments, however, can be divided into three broad categories: a
natural affiliation argument, an autonomy argument, and a social stability argument. Furthermore, each of these arguments draws from its own history, tradition, and internal theory on the purpose and nature of the family. Each of the
arguments also exists in contradiction—or at least in tension—with the others.
Although the Biden administration has undone many of the policies against
which these arguments were levied, the arguments themselves deserve closer
inspection, as they touch on the theoretical underpinnings of a right to family
reunification, a right that is not yet widely recognized in U.S. courts. Understanding the theory behind this right can better equip advocates to translate these
moral arguments into legal arguments in future litigation. The utility of these
arguments in constitutional litigation will depend on the ability of advocates to
adapt the arguments to relatively narrow jurisprudential frameworks. Finally, a
close examination of two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Obergefell v.
Hodges and Kerry v. Din, will help illustrate the difficulties that advocates face
when invoking constitutional rights to challenge state action that keeps families apart.
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Natural Affiliation: “Families Belong Together”
By far the most common moral argument made against the Trump administration’s family immigration policies was a deceptively simple one, the idea that
families naturally belong together. This notion has made its way into debates
about immigration policy in a variety of ways, from an unspoken assumption
that family ties are naturally rooted in biology to the very literal phrase “families belong together” that has become popular with pro-immigrant activists.
Activists first adopted the phrase “families belong together” as the central
slogan for protests following reports that DHS had separated over two thousand
children from their parents.6 During this period of public outcry, the natural
affiliation argument appeared in several versions. The simplest version of the
natural affiliation argument was an appeal to human empathy and decency. This
version asserts that separating families is cruel, particularly toward the children
affected, but does not offer further interrogation of the reasons—biological, psychological, or cultural—this might be true. Rather, this version of the argument
relies on an implicit assumption that parents and children share a natural or
special connection, the severance of which is painful.
Protesters advancing this version of the argument emphasized the emotional trauma that family separation inflicts on children and referred to Trump
administration policies as “child abuse” (Hamilton 2018). Protesters carried signs
bearing the slogans “Families belong together / Las familias merecen estar unidas,” “Separating families is cruel torture,” “Make America humane again,” and
countless more (see, e.g., Murdoch 2018; Families Belong Together 2018; AJ+ 2018a,
2018b). Other signs bore evocative imagery of cages, outstretched hands, and crying children, designed to convey the emotional gravity of family separation.
Protesters interviewed at the marches called for the Trump administration and
its supporters to imagine the emotional distress inflicted on separated children
(Lei 2018).
Advocates have used this simplest version of the natural affiliation argument to oppose the Trump administration’s other anti-immigration policies.
Similar appeals to empathy and emotion appeared in response to the “travel
ban,” an executive order that restricted certain categories of people from entry
into the United States if they came from Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, or Somalia. For instance, Mohamed Alahiri, a U.S. citizen waiting
for a waiver for his Yemeni wife, told reporters that his eight-year-old daughter
was “crying day and night”: “She wants her sisters and mother. She’s lost 10
pounds and bites her fingernails until the meat comes out” (Michaelson 2019).
The argument has also been used to garner public support for “sanctuary” policies, wherein state and local governments decide as a matter of official policy to
limit their cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Activists and state politicians have presented sanctuary policies as “another way
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to keep families together” (Washington 2018). For example, Sam Hammar, a Massachusetts State Senate candidate, called for the passage of a Massachusetts
sanctuary bill by juxtaposing “stories about babies being ripped from their
mothers’ arms” at the border and “stories of families being torn apart right here
in Massachusetts.” 7
This version of the natural affiliation argument has also been used to oppose
the Trump administration’s policies regarding visas and citizenship rights for
same-sex partners and the children of same-sex couples (on the difficulties that
same-sex couples face in the U.S. immigration system, see Luibhéid, this volume).
Under the Trump administration, the Department of State’s policy treated the
children of same-sex, U.S. citizen couples born through techniques such as surrogacy and in vitro fertilization as being “out of wedlock” and therefore subject
to higher requirements for transmission of U.S. citizenship.8 The State Department also announced that it would require proof of marriage before issuing
family visas to same-sex domestic partners of foreign diplomats or employees of
international organizations, a practice that made obtaining a visa more challenging for couples native to countries that have not recognized same-sex marriage
(BBC News 2018). Critics of these policies have appealed not only to antidiscrimination principles but also to the natural affiliation argument, by focusing on the
love that family members feel for each other and the cruelty of keeping family
members separated.9
A second version of the natural affiliation argument offers a religious explanation for why families share this natural connection. For example, the Interfaith Immigration Coalition—a partnership of faith-based organizations—issued
a joint statement condemning family separations, using the hashtag #FamiliesBelongTogether. There, John McCullough, president of Church World Ser vices,
stated, “Human dignity is granted to us by our creator and strengthened by our
familial bonds. The administration’s recent attacks against families are unconscionable and violate the sanctity of the family unit. . . . As we honor our faiths,
so too must we honor the family” (Tramonte 2018). Rebecca Linder Blachly, director of the Episcopal Church Office of Government Relations, expressed a similar
sentiment, stating, “Separating children from their parents is both inhumane
and ineffective, and is at odds with the priority of families within the Christian
tradition” (Tramonte 2018). Underlying these statements is the belief that the
family unit is not only natural but also divinely ordained; conversely, the separation of that family unit is immoral— even sinful.10
A third version of the natural affiliation argument explicitly invokes science
as the basis for decrying family separation, particularly where young children are
involved. This version of the argument posits that the natural connection
between family members is a product of human psychology and casts the trauma
of family separation as a mental health or medical issue. During and after the
Trump administration’s zero-tolerance policy, multiple health-care professionals
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and researchers warned that family separation inflicts “toxic stress” on separated children and that exposure to such stress over time inflicts lasting damage
on a child’s development (Santhanam 2018; Rienzi 2018; Shonkoff 2019). After
touring a “tender age shelter” in South Texas, Collen Kraft, president of the
American Academy of Pediatrics, remarked, “We know that separating parents
from children is not a great idea, but science tells us this is actually child abuse,
because we’re impacting the development of their brains” (Rienzi 2018).
This scientific version of the natural affiliation argument appeared prominently in the U.S. House of Representatives’ investigation into the zero-tolerance
policy’s implementation. As part of its oversight duties over DHHS, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce called Jack P. Shonkoff, director of the Harvard Center of the Developing Child, to testify about the effects of toxic stress;
Shonkoff (2019) commented, “From a scientific perspective, the forcible separation of children from their parents is like setting a house on fire. Prolonging that
separation is like preventing the first responders from doing their jobs.” A month
later, the concept of toxic stress appeared again when the House Homeland
Security Committee questioned the then secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen
Nielsen on the zero-tolerance policy.11 Representative Lauren Underwood opened
her questioning by saying, “I’m not a lawyer, I’m a nurse. Madam Secretary, I want
to be very clear about what the family separation policy is doing to children’s
mental and physical health.” Underwood then proceeded to ask Nielsen if DHS
was aware that family separation causes toxic stress in children, to which the
secretary responded that she was “not familiar with that term” (PBS 2019).
The use of the natural affiliation argument in advocacy echoes the arguments made by philosophers and political theorists who study the moral underpinnings of family reunification. For example, Martha C. Nussbaum names
affiliation, including intimate family or personal relations, as one of the fundamental qualities that makes us human. So, too, does the experience of having
been an infant, or other experiences of “extreme dependency, need, and affection” (Nussbaum 1995, 78). Iseult Honohan (2009, 772) expands on this concept,
positing that “the fundamental human interest in and need for affiliation” demonstrates itself through the giving and receiving of care. Family members, she
argues, have “certain special obligations to one another by virtue of their relationship” (Honohan 2009, 772). Caleb Yong (2016, 72–73) argues in a slightly different vein that it is those who are dependent on others—largely, but not
exclusively, children—who have the strongest claim for a human right in association with an individual on whom they have become dependent, for not only
material but also “attitudinal” care. These philosophical analyses supplement
the basic affiliation argument in a dif ferent way than the religious and scientific versions of the argument do, through a recognition that interdependent, caring relationships are a feature of humanity and need to be supported and
recognized in both culture and law. The nearest advocacy arguments have come
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to articulating a care-based justification for natural affiliation has been in the
context of breastfeeding mothers separated from children. There, the child is
traumatized and endangered because of the sudden cessation of access to his or
her mother’s milk. But the mother suffers as well, both physically and psychologically, because she is unable to continue to fulfill the obligation of care that
she has to her infant.12
The natural affiliation argument has strong emotional appeal and significant religious and scientific theories to support it. But how useful will it be in
challenging family separation policies as a matter of law? In considering how well
it would translate into a legal right, we should evaluate several aspects of it.
First, who would be the rights claimant? Or, put differently, which family
members does the argument privilege? In most current iterations, although parents may have natural “rights” in the natural affiliation argument, the focus is
squarely on the traumatized child who has been separated from his or her parents too early. Additional attention to the focus on caregiving as a necessary
component of affiliation could strengthen rights claims by parents. Under this
view, separation should be prevented not only to avoid trauma to the child but
also to ensure that the parents are able to continue their “right to discharge special obligations” of care to their child (Honohan 2009, 772).
Next, what are the argument’s politics? The natural affiliation argument can
have a progressive or conservative tenor depending on how it is deployed.
Although the argument was a favorite of progressives opposing President Trump’s
policies, it is easy to imagine it being used to oppose legal abortion, to punish
criminally parents who abandon their children, or as an argument against tax
subsidies or state sponsorship of childcare for working parents. Understanding
the politics of the argument would be impor tant for developing an advocacy
strategy that could persuade conservative judges and also for thinking through
the long-term policy implications of success in areas beyond the current
dispute.
Finally, what is the argument’s relationship to citizenship and national sovereignty? The natural affiliation argument in its purest form appears to be untethered to legal citizenship or geographic location. According to the inner logic
of the argument, the citizenship or immigration status of the members of a family
is irrelevant to the moral issue of whether its members can be separated, and
the geographic location or legal jurisdiction also makes no difference.13 In reality, of course, because the law is used to encourage and deter specific kinds of
behav ior, any legal application of the natural affiliation theory would need to
take into account various options available to the members of the family and
the choices they have made. The remedy available to a family asserting a right to
live together, for example, will be dif ferent if there is only one country where
that is possible. The structure of U.S. immigration law, in addition, distinguishes
between those who are inside and outside the border and those who are in
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various states of citizenship, membership, or nonmembership; all of these
factors will matter in how the natural affiliation argument could emerge in
specific cases.

Autonomy: Individuals Have the Right to Choose Their Families
Although natural affiliation has been far and away the most popular advocacy
argument, a distinct argument that emerged in some of the debates surrounding the Trump immigration policies is quite dif ferent. This second argument,
one that focuses on autonomy, emphasizes the importance of individual choice
in family formation. This argument expresses family separation not as a loss of
connection but as a denial of the fundamental freedom of choice.
The autonomy argument has been deployed in a variety of contexts where
immigration enforcement prevents parents, children, and spouses from freely living together, especially where at least one family member is a U.S. citizen. For
example, members of the Libertarian Party have leveled such arguments at the
Trump administration’s decision not to renew temporary protected status (TPS)
for immigrants from El Salvador, where nonrenewal will force nearly two hundred
thousand American-born U.S. citizen children with TPS-recipient parents either to
live without a parent or to leave the United States. These critics characterized the
decision to end the TPS program for Salvadorans as an impermissible government
interference with individual family decisions (Libertarian Party 2018).
Activists also leveled the autonomy argument against the travel ban. Sirine
Shebaya, an attorney for the civil rights organization Muslim Advocates, called
the travel ban “a ban on families being reunified in the United States [and] a
ban on families and communities being able to live normally and freely just like
everybody else in the United States” (Yu 2018). Najib, a naturalized citizen of Syrian origin who gave only his first name, described the frustration he felt when
the travel ban blocked his petition for a family visa for his mother, saying, “I feel
like a citizen that literally has reduced rights—it doesn’t feel right” (Yu 2018).
Shebaya’s and Najib’s comments use the autonomy argument to assert an associational right to live with one’s family.
The autonomy argument has also appeared in response to a reported ICE
practice of detaining spouses who appear at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Ser vices offices for marriage visa interviews. Under current immigration regulations, certain undocumented immigrants who marry a U.S. citizen may apply
for a provisional unlawful presence waiver of inadmissibility, a mechanism
designed to minimize the length of spousal separation during marriage visa processing.14 However, under the Trump administration, immigration attorneys
noticed “an unmistakable swell” of ICE detentions at marriage interviews, such
that they could “no longer in good conscience encourage their clients to go to
their marriage interviews” to pursue provisional waivers.15
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Lilian Calderon, one of many spouses caught in this bind, used the autonomy argument in response to her detention, remarking:
I didn’t understand. How could they do this to my family when I was
just following regulations? Why was I being taken to an undisclosed
location? . . . [A year after being released], my life is in limbo. . . . I am
grateful to not be in detainment. But our laws are so broken that a Rhode
Islander like myself can’t love or live. Plainly, I’m not allowed to live up to
my potential as a human being or citizen and as I write this I don’t know
if I will ever be.16

Calderon and her family certainly experienced emotional distress while she was
detained, enough that she could make a natural affiliation argument that her
“family belongs together.” This part of her statement, however, makes a broader
normative claim that immigration law should not interfere with her ability to
love and live with whom she wishes.
Like the natural affiliation argument, the autonomy argument is not new. It
is in fact quite firmly grounded in liberal political theory.17 Matthew Lister (2010,
721), for example, considers family reunification as a subspecies of “the fundamental right to form intimate relationships of one’s choosing,” a right he understands as essential “in the development and exercise of what [John] Rawls calls
‘the moral powers.’ ” Lister argues that this right, in turn, flows from a more general right to freedom of association, where intimate association deserves especially impor tant status (Lister 2010, 733).18
Just as we considered how the natural affiliation argument would translate
into legal language, we can evaluate the autonomy argument along the same
axes. First, who are the rights claimants? Like the natural affiliation argument,
the autonomy argument has been used in defense of the parent-child relationship. However, while the natural affiliation argument focused on children as
rights claimants, the autonomy argument focuses primarily on parents’ claims to
a right to reunification. Only the parents have obtained the ability to exercise
their autonomy as free adults. When applied to the spousal relationship, the
argument confers autonomy interests on men and women, although historically,
the argument has been one of husbands’ rights to exercise citizenship by choosing and taking responsibility for their wives (Calvo 1991). Although the focus in
the current debates has been on immediate family relationships, there is nothing
inherent to the autonomy argument that would prevent it from being applied to
extended family relationships. The exercise of autonomy, however, requires one
to have legal status (e.g., adulthood) that allows one to make autonomous choices.
Like the natural affiliation argument, the autonomy argument is politically
flexible. It is also the argument most appealing to libertarians and has been
embraced by libertarian philosophers and advocates (Van der Vossen and Brennan 2018; Babcock 2014).
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Finally, unlike the natural affiliation argument, the autonomy argument is
very much tethered to citizenship. Consider again Najib’s claim that “I feel like
a citizen that literally has reduced rights—it doesn’t feel right.” This tying of
autonomy to the exercise of citizenship does not necessarily mean that the person exercising citizenship is someone who has legal citizenship status. The
autonomy argument has been raised by individuals who lack legal citizenship
but nevertheless consider themselves members of their communities. Consider
Lilian Calderon’s identification of herself as a “Rhode Islander” who “can’t love
or live” and is “not allowed to live up to [her] potential as a human being or citizen.” Unlike other regimes, such as European human rights law, however, U.S.
law has more explicitly tied the exercise of autonomy to those with formal status. This exercise of citizenship through family choice has been at the core of
American identity from the conquest and settlement of the United States, to the
creation of the family property systems that supported slavery in the American
South, to the integration of former slaves into the polity following the Civil War
(Cott 2002; Rana 2014).19 As a result, successful translations of the autonomy
argument into constitutional claims will be easier when a citizen or someone
with durable legal status is the claimant.

Stability: Families Promote a Well-Functioning Society
A third argument levied against the Trump family policies is one that emphasizes the good of the community. This argument contends that the family unit
promotes social stability. As such, the government should foster healthy marriages and strong parent-child relationships and encourage families to live
together. Conversely, if the government enacts policies that threaten family unity
or make it harder for families to thrive, then society will become less stable and
less safe. (This argument, as Saskia Bonjour and Massilia Ourabah’s chapter in
this volume makes clear, can also be used to exclude or denigrate family structures believed to be contrary to social stability, such as polygamy.)
Because of its focus on the benefits to American society, the stability argument has appeared most frequently where immigration policy threatens immigrant and mixed-status families— where some members are undocumented,
while others are citizens or have lawful immigration status—who are already living within the United States. Two versions of the stability argument have
emerged. The first understands families as good for society because the love and
support of the family structure helps people succeed in life. As the historian
Carly Goodman argued in an op-ed, “Reuniting families through the immigration system is not only humane—recognizing that for many people, families are
a source of love and support—but also contributes to stability, prosperity and
stronger communities: Having support networks increases the odds of people
succeeding and contributing to their communities.” 20 In other words, the
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natural affiliation argument is not wrong, but there is also a societal interest in
strong families. Conversely, so the argument goes, disrupting the family structure makes it more difficult for people to succeed and contribute to society. In
another op-ed, Janet Murguía gives examples of how disrupting the familial
support network is bad for the country, noting that children in disrupted families are less likely to succeed. Pointing toward toxic stress, school absenteeism,
and financial hardship resulting from family separations, she asserts that the
Trump administration’s policies “could disrupt an entire generation of American children” by “chipping away at what makes this country great: the American family.” 21
Because the Trump policies attacked the parent-child relationship so
directly, many of the narratives and images focused on by activists involved
children. But the Trump administration also curtailed many forms of family
reunification, including not only for spouses but also for grandparents and siblings. One of the objections to the travel ban, for example, was that it prevented
U.S. citizens from being with extended families for impor tant life events, such
as weddings, graduations, and funerals, and litigants successfully challenged the
administration’s exclusion of “grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law,
sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins” as people with a
“bona fide relationship” to a person in the United States.22 Additionally, the number of family-sponsored visas granted during the Trump presidency declined
precipitously, from over 238,000 in 2016 to fewer than 20,000 in 2021; familysponsored visas in the United States include visas for minor and adult children
of permanent residents, as well as adult children and siblings of U.S. citizens
(Anderson 2020). Extended families are often touted as one of the more stabilizing forces for immigrants, as they help one another to acculturate and provide financial stability (Abrams 2013b).
The second version of the stability argument posits that the fear of family
separation can prevent families from thriving, thereby undercutting the benefit to society that the family unit would normally provide. This version of the
argument is distinct but logically related to the first. Under this version of
the argument, the threat of family separation disincentivizes families from
living openly in society and availing themselves of societal benefits, even where
they have not been physically separated. As a result, those families may struggle, and the benefits of familial love and support that the first version of the
argument highlights are undone.
This version of the stability argument is notably one of the rationales behind
the “sanctuary jurisdiction” movement. Advocates for sanctuary policies have
argued that the cooperation of local police with ICE discourages undocumented
immigrants and their family members from availing themselves of two key benefits of society: the protection of local police and access to the justice system.
As a result, the family members affected become more vulnerable and less likely
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to be productive members of society. For example, in promoting the Massachusetts Safe Communities Act, the Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition argued: “Many immigrants fear that calling 911 or speaking to
police will lead to separation from family members— especially children—making
them more vulnerable to domestic abuse, wage theft and other crimes. Barring
state and local law enforcement and court personnel from asking people about
their immigration status would send a strong message that in our Commonwealth, police protect us all” (MIRA Coalition 2019). In support of a similar
sanctuary bill in California, governor Jerry Brown asserted that reducing cooperation with ICE would bring comfort to families living in fear and promote safer
communities (Adler 2017).23 Thus, sanctuary policies may be understood as seeking not only to reduce the number of families separated by ICE but also to allow
immigrant and mixed-status families to stop living in fear and avail themselves
of society’s protection.
Similar arguments have been made concerning other societal benefits such
as school attendance and access to health care (Artiga, Damico, and Garfield
2018).24 Advocates have noted that the threat of family separation by ICE has disincentivized mixed families from accessing health care, education, and public
benefits such as Medicaid and SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). Maria Hernandez, director of a Texas nonprofit serving children with
special needs, spoke to parents who “feel like they can’t risk any attention from
the government, even if that means losing badly-needed benefits for their kids”
(Lopez 2018). She remarked that those parents were opting out of public benefits
“out of fear of deportation . . . out of fear of having their children being penalized
in some way and potentially losing a parent” (Lopez 2018). Once again, the implications of this fear effect is that affected family members, especially children,
will go without social benefits and be less likely to become thriving members of
society.
Like the autonomy argument, the stability argument is fundamentally
grounded in political theory. Undergirding this social stability argument is a deepseated belief that the family unit is a good way to organize society. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1979) famously argued that the family is a microcosm of the state, in
which children learn to love and become loyal to the state.25 Contemporary theorists understand the family as important to stability because the family is our culture’s method of addressing “the fact of dependency” (Eichner 2010, 48).
How will the social stability argument translate into legal claims? Unlike
the other two arguments, this argument focuses on society at large rather than
on individual rights claimants. As such, it is less useful as the basis of a legal
claim and more useful as supporting evidence for why the state should care.
However, a version of the natural affiliation argument focused on the importance
of caretaking relationships could be supplemented by arguments about how
those relationships promote social stability.
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Like the other arguments, the politics of the social stability argument are
potentially wide-ranging (for a discussion of family migration and its perceived
connection to the “national legal order, gender order, and identity order” in
French political history, see Bonjour and Ourabah, this volume, 59). Social stability could have great appeal to conservatives who want to preserve the traditional family because they believe it supports a moral and organized society. It
could also be appealing to progressives who believe that the state should supplement the caregiving families provide for each other through subsidies and
other means.
Finally, the social stability argument does not have a clear connection to
citizenship status. With regard to already existing families, it acknowledges their
presence and argues that it is good for society that they remain intact. With
regard to families that do not yet exist, it would encourage the formation of families. Because the social stability argument operates as evidence for the positive
outcomes of recognizing rights under the other two arguments but not as a rights
claim on its own, its tie to citizenship will rely in part on which of the other arguments it supports.

Translation of Moral Arguments into Constitutional Arguments
How do these three moral arguments translate into constitutional claims?
Although U.S. law has long privileged family unity to an extent rarely seen in
other countries, this privileging of the family has taken place outside the context of constitutional law, so rights claims to family unity are very difficult to
make. Despite this difficulty, litigants and courts began to articulate the moral
claims made in response to Trump immigration policies in constitutional terms.

Statutory Family Rights
To understand the context in which these constitutional claims arose, one must
understand the two major mechanisms through which U.S. law has fostered
family unity, both of which are extra-constitutional. The first is reflected through
the common law of the family, which was reflected early on in state case law and
later through state statutes. This body of law set up a hierarchical system where
fathers, husbands, and masters possessed legal responsibility and control over
children, mothers, and servants (or, in slave states, enslaved people). Volumes
have been written on the history of the common law of the family, and in particular on the law of coverture, whereby married women “perform[ed] everything” under the “wing, protection, and cover” of their husbands (Blackstone
2016, 442). For our purposes, the impor tant principle emanating from coverture
was one of marital unity. Husbands had a legal and financial responsibility to
their wives, and wives had a responsibility to serve their husbands. These mutual
responsibilities required a shared domicile, the right of the husband to
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establish the location of the family residence and the obligation of the wife to
follow (Abrams 2013a).
Thus, coverture and similar doctrines concerning parent-child and masterservant relationships embodied a version of the autonomy argument that used
hierarchical status categories, reified traditional gender roles, and supported
white supremacy. But this version of the autonomy argument came not in the form
of a federal constitutional right to family unity but instead a network of state case
law, statutes, and state constitutional provisions that structured the relationships
between family members in their everyday lives. In other words, husbands had
the right to live with their wives not because the U.S. Constitution said so, but
because it was the way that they fulfilled their legal obligation to provide and take
moral responsibility for their wives; wives had no “right” to be with their husbands at all, but had a legal responsibility to serve them (Abrams 2013a).26
The second vehicle for family reunification in U.S. law comes through federal immigration statutes. Early immigration to the United States was largely
unrestricted, but when Congress began to enact quotas in the early twentieth
century, it included preferences for family members.27 These preferences were
amended and codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952 and
retained in the Immigration Act of 1965, which did away with national origin
quotas and instituted labor-based visas (Abrams 2013b).28
Like earlier common law and state statutory mechanisms for fostering
family unity, the federal statutory approach implicitly endorses the autonomy
argument for family reunification. The statute permits individuals who already
have status, either legal citizenship or permanent residence, to exercise their
freedom to choose with whom they will live by sponsoring family members to
join them in the United States.29 There is no corresponding right of a noncitizen
or nonresident to join a U.S. citizen or resident family members. The statute
makes no moral distinction between family reunification and family formation;
U.S. citizens can sponsor their spouses for a visa the day after they marry or fifty
years later. These features and others have led scholars to observe that modern
immigration law reflects the earlier structures of coverture in U.S. common law
(Calvo 1991; Balgamwalla 2014). Just as under the doctrine of coverture a wife’s
legal identity was subsumed by her husband’s, under contemporary immigration
statutes the primary beneficiary makes the decision whether to sponsor his or
her spouse; the spouse has no claim unless the primary visa holder chooses to
sponsor his or her application.

Constitutional Family Rights
Although U.S. law treats the family as a central organizing principle in common
law and privileges family unity over most other factors in its immigration statutes, family unity has not received broad protection in constitutional law. One
impor tant reason why is that the U.S. Constitution is fairly short and terse, and
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the Supreme Court has often shied away from reading rights into it that are not
textually present. To be sure, when the court has read the Constitution expansively, the rights in question have often involved the family. These instances,
however, have been fairly infrequent, and the resulting opinions have been written in ways that curtail the scope of the right in question (Meyer 2000). They
have also been framed almost exclusively using an autonomy model of the family:
these are cases about the rights of individuals to make decisions about choices
such as whether to use contraception, whether to obtain an abortion, how to
educate a child, whether a child’s grandparents can visit, or whether to marry.
These have not been cases about the rights of a family as a unit (Lau 2006).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court had two occasions to consider family rights
in a constitutional context. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court heard the
cases of several same-sex couples who challenged various restrictions on samesex marriage under state law in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee; in a
landmark opinion, the court established a constitutional right to marry.30 In
Kerry v. Din, Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen, challenged the U.S. government’s denial
of the visa application of her husband, Kanishka Berashk; Din and Berashk had
filed a petition for a spousal visa, but the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan,
denied Berashk’s visa application, informing him only that he was inadmissible
to enter the United States under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, the section of
the statute that covers terrorist activities. The court established that a U.S. citizen has a due process liberty interest in his or her marriage to a noncitizen,
although the court determined that Din’s due process interest was not violated
when the United States refused her husband a visa with very little explanation.31
Both cases illustrate the perils of asserting a constitutional claim to family unity
under U.S. law.
Obergefell is instructive because the justifications the majority opinion uses
to support a constitutional right to marry loosely track the moral arguments
identified above. In Obergefell, the majority opinion identified four “principles”
and “traditions” that “demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.” 32 The majority opinion leads with the autonomy argument: “A first premise of the Court’s
relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” 33 This notion of autonomy
emphasizes choice and self-definition. “Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny,” the court explained. It then cites to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts’s opinion in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, which held that because
marriage “fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express
our common humanity, [it] is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether
and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”34
The next Obergefell principle is a marriage-focused version of the natural
affiliation argument. “The right to marry,” the court explained “is fundamental
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because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to
the committed individuals.” 35 This argument appears somewhat tautological
(“marriage is marriage because it is [insert definition of marriage]”), but a close
look reveals that it has a similar basis to the biological, psychological, and religious bases that support other uses of the natural affiliation argument. The opinion cites to Griswold v. Connecticut, noting that the court in that opinion
described marriage as “older than the Bill of Rights.” 36 The idea is that marriage
is pre-legal, a natural coming together that the law should not impede, recognized
by law precisely because it precedes it.
The social stability argument also shows its face in Obergefell, in another
principle identified by the opinion: “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.” 37 Here, the court
quotes from Maynard v. Hill, describing marriage as “the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.” 38
Curiously, the Obergefell majority relies on social stability as a justification for
the right to marry, not as a justification for state regulation of marriage as has
been more typical in constitutional litigation.39
Finally, Obergefell included an additional principle supporting the right to
marry: marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.” 40 The implication here is that childrearing, procreation, and education are also protected constitutionally, perhaps for the same reasons marriage is.
Thus, in Obergefell, we see the three moral arguments made by activists
effectively translated into a constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples.
Despite the apparently broad reach of this right, it is of more limited use than
might initially appear, especially in the context of immigrant families. The right
is most useful in challenging laws that prohibit par ticular classes of people from
marrying or that deny recognition of those marriages. It is less useful in challenging state action that keeps families apart.
To understand that difficultly, Kerry v. Din is instructive. This case, decided
just days before Obergefell, addressed squarely an issue of family reunification.
There, a U.S. citizen woman sought to sponsor her husband for an immigrant
visa and the government denied the petition on grounds of counterterrorism.
The government, however, gave Din almost no information about its reasons for
denying the visa, either by specifying with more particularity the statutory
grounds or by sharing purported facts about her husband’s activities. In contrast
to Obergefell, in Din the court was untroubled by the denial of family rights. Four
members of the court (dissenting) asserted that Din had a constitutional liberty
interest in her spouse’s visa application. Three justices (Justice Antonin Scalia,
authoring a plurality opinion joined by two others), asserted that she had no such
interest. Two justices (Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, authoring a concurrence
joined by one other), held that even assuming Din had such an interest, her due
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process rights had not been violated, largely because of the government’s interest in preventing terrorism.41 The Din opinions highlight the tension between
recognizing a constitutional right to family reunification and deference to the
executive branch where national security concerns are raised. In summary,
although six justices entertained the idea that Din had a constitutional right to
family reunification, the majority of justices voted that the government’s denial
of her husband’s visa on national security grounds, with little to no explanation,
did not violate whatever rights she might have had.
The open question after Din is whether the court could recognize a constitutional liberty interest in family reunification absent the facts suggesting terrorist activity; claims of terrorist activity or threats to national security have long
been mobilized to upend family unity (Abrams 2017). There are hints in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence that the court might be more expansive in cases where
terrorism is not an issue. Much of the opinion focuses on the importance of
the state’s interest in combating terrorism and the care with which Congress
crafted the relevant section of the INA; it is only in the context of alleged terrorism that Congress is not required to provide an alien denied a visa with the
“specific provision under which the alien is admissible.” 42 The opinion suggests
that the constitutional liberty interests of U.S. citizens in living with their families must be balanced against federal interests and that in the counterterrorism
context (“this sensitive area”), Congress “evaluated the benefits and burdens of
notice in this sensitive area and assigned discretion to the Executive to decide
when more detailed disclosure is appropriate.”43 The implicit suggestion is that
in other, less sensitive, areas, lodging all discretion to carry out this balancing
in the executive might be inappropriate. The composition of the court, however, has shifted substantially since Obergefell and Din. Justice Kennedy, author
of the Obergefell majority and controlling Din concurrence, has retired, and Justice Scalia, author of the Din plurality, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
joined the dissent, have passed away. It is doubtful but not impossible that their
replacements, Justices Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett
would have a more expansive view of family reunification rights than those of
their predecessors.
Assuming for the moment that the court would recognize a constitutional
liberty interest in family reunification in cases that do not involve allegations of
terrorism, what would this right look like? Given previous case law, it is quite
likely that it would be an autonomy right. Most U.S. constitutional cases have
involved autonomy—parental decision-making about children’s education,
decisions about whether to use contraception or undergo an abortion, and decisions about whom to marry. Obergefell opens up this space a bit, by introducing
the natural affiliation and social stability arguments side by side with autonomy.
Without the autonomy argument, however, these other arguments are likely to
flounder. In Din, the only reason that the court appeared to take seriously the
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claim of a constitutional liberty interest was Din’s status as a U.S. citizen. And
when the Trump administration curtailed its initial travel ban, it was to remove
application of the ban to individuals with permanent residency—individuals
who, in other words, had already been granted a certain level of membership in
the polity that guaranteed them some autonomy.

Conclusion
U.S. constitutional law has historically not been a space for the flourishing
of family rights. The Supreme Court has identified and enforced constitutional
family rights sparingly, and most family rights arise instead from state common
and statutory law or federal statutory law. Nevertheless, there is some room to
make claims for family reunification. The moral arguments made by activists
and litigants—natural affiliation, autonomy, and social stability— all have precedents in constitutional family law. In order to mobilize these arguments in the
new context of family reunification, litigants will need to find ways to couch
these arguments in autonomy terms, even where the autonomy argument may
not be the most natural fit. The proliferation of these moral arguments, however, may indicate that change is around the corner. The American people have
transformed the meaning of their Constitution multiple times, not through
amendments but through what Bruce Ackerman (1993) has termed “constitutional moments,” periods in history in which Americans are actively involved
in the construction of the meaning of the Constitution. One cannot know with
certainty if one is “in” a constitutional moment, but it is fair to say that the
United States (and much of the world) is currently a state where many of our
political norms—including a commitment to some form of welfare state, an
openness to authorized immigration, and an understanding of the United States
as having a leadership role internationally— are actively contested.
With the end of the Trump presidency, this moment might initially seem
less urgent. Many of the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies have
already been repealed, and, as a result, much of the litigation— and the arguments we have highlighted in this chapter— around those policies will not
reach the Supreme Court. However, at the time of this writing, many of the families separated by policies like the travel ban and zero tolerance remain separated because of Trump-era COVID-19 restrictions on certain family-based visas,
and some separated family members simply have not yet been located.44 Furthermore, it is impor tant to remember that Biden was able to reverse much of the
Trump administration’s immigration agenda so quickly because he could replace
Trump’s executive orders with his own, without the need for congressional
action. Although the Biden administration and Democrats in the House of Representatives have proposed a series of immigration reforms, including eliminating some barriers in the family-based immigration system, it is quite possible
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that the U.S. immigration system will remain subject to sweeping change by
executive action for the foreseeable future, and even statutes can be undone.45
This inherent instability underscores the relative lack of constitutional precedents supporting a right to family reunification in U.S. immigration law, a gap
that advocates and litigants will have to bridge in the absence of statutory rights
and shifting enforcement priorities. In other words, even if the end of the Trump
presidency means that the immediate threats to family reunification have
abated, the unstable nature of U.S. immigration law means that these arguments
will be deployed in the near future with another series of executive orders. If,
indeed, a future administration forces the issue, then we will be, as we were during Reconstruction and the New Deal, in a moment where our fundamental
understanding of our Constitution could undergo radical change.
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